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Recent scholarship on authoritarian responsiveness has found limited, ad hoc responsiveness to 
public concern by local governments in China.  However, almost nothing is known about the outcomes 
of this responsiveness.  We do not know if the outcomes are ever substantively meaningful for the 
public, nor whether they “feed back” on public concern in authoritarian systems. To address this gap, I 
propose a novel responsiveness-feedback model with outcomes, and apply it to air pollution in Chinese 
cities because of the issue’s importance and objectively measurable severity.  I estimate the 
relationships between pubic concern, government action, and air pollution levels in 273 cities from 
2013-2015 using structural equation models to account for feedback, and find evidence of substantively 
meaningful responsiveness and outcomes-based feedback.  I speculate that our model also applies to 
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The degree to which a government responds to public concern is an important issue in political science.  
Every person’s wellbeing depends in part on the degree to which his or her government responds to 
citizens’ concerns.  While responsiveness in wealthy democracies has been well studied (Jennings 2009; 
Jones et al. 1977; Mladenka 1981; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995) responsiveness in 
authoritarian systems remains poorly understood.  Recent studies on China have found limited, ad hoc 
responsiveness in issue areas the regime considers non-sensitive (Cai 2010; Distelhorst and Hou 2017; 
Manion 2014; Meng, Pan, and Yang 2017; Truex 2016).  However, little is known about the substantive 
outcomes.  We do not know if the ad hoc responsiveness scholars have identified ever aggregates into 
outcomes that are meaningful for the general public—or whether the responsiveness is too infrequent, 
narrowly targeted, and superficial to be perceptible.  We also do not know whether the outcomes 
themselves influence public concerns through a “feedback” effect.  
This paper proposes a model of policy responsiveness and feedback at the local level in an 
authoritarian system.  For responsiveness, we theorize that 1) public concern with a problem increases 
the level of local government action addressing that problem, and 2) the increased government action 
mitigates the problem’s severity.  For feedback, we theorize that a problem’s severity has a direct, 
positive feedback effect on 1) public concern, and 2) government action directed at the problem (see 
Figure 1 in the theory section).  To empirically test this model, we look at a specific policy domain in an 
authoritarian system: air pollution in Chinese cities.  We look specifically at this issue because it is 
universally important, observable by the public, and objectively measurable. 
Testing this model requires estimating the relationships between public concern, government 
action, and air pollution.  To do this, we use a structural equation model (SEM), which allows us to 
account for the error correlation that often results from feedback dynamics.  I compare the SEM results 
with standard regressions that assume uncorrelated errors, and conduct a series of robustness checks 
that account for air pollution spillover between cities.  The analysis is based on a sample of 273 Chinese 
cities from 2013-2015. 
The empirical results support the model, allowing this paper to make two major contributions.  
The first is finding evidence of substantively meaningful responsiveness in an authoritarian system.  The 
implication of this finding is that the limited, ad hoc responsiveness extant scholarship has found in 
China appears to aggregate into outcomes large enough to significantly affect the general public within 
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this issue domain.  Until now, there has been no clear evidence that substantive responsiveness exists 
within any issue domain in China or other authoritarian regimes.  Thus, this finding is itself an important 
contribution.  It is also an important step towards understanding how responsiveness varies across issue 
areas in non-democratic settings. 
The second contribution is finding evidence of a feedback dynamic in an authoritarian system.  
Feedback has been studied in wealthy democracies, most notably by scholarship on the thermostatic  
model (Jennings 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995).1  However, there are no studies that 
examine this phenomenon in an authoritarian context.  A notable characteristic of the feedback I find is 
that it is driven by an outcome (i.e., air pollution).  This contradicts the thermostatic model which 
predicts only policy-based feedback, where the public responds directly to the policies addressing an 
issue and not outcomes of those policies (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995).  The outcomes-
based feedback we find may have implications for our understanding of responsiveness and feedback 
dynamics beyond the authoritarian context.  For reasons we touch on in the final section, I speculate 
that outcomes-based feedback tends to dominate at the local level where outcomes are more concrete 
and easily observable, while policy-based feedback dominates at the national level.   Whatever the 
cause of this contradiction turns out to be, our finding suggests a fruitful path for future scholarship. 
While this study looks only at air pollution in Chinese cities, this model may also apply to other 
countries and issue areas.  As a highly authoritarian regime, China is likely not drastically more 
responsive to public concern than other countries with strong states, be they democracies or 
dictatorships.  It is therefore plausible that our model applies to other countries with air pollution 
problems.  This model may apply to other issue areas too, as its logic is consistent with any domain 
where local actors have influence and the public can directly observe outcomes.  Such issue areas may 
include public transportation, road maintenance, and other forms of local infrastructure. 
                                                          
1 The model stipulates that public preferences for more (less) government spending in an issue area causes the 
government to respond, and that the government responding to those preferences reduces the public's 
preference for additional spending increases (decreases) in that issue area. 
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2 STATE OF THE LITERATURE 
The primary driver of authoritarian responsiveness in China is self-preservation, both at the level of the 
regime and individual officials.  Avoiding—and, when necessary, containing—outbreaks of public 
upheaval is necessary for the regime’s survival.  For individual officials, the maintenance of social 
stability is one of the few firm criteria for career advancement within the regime.  Public protests and 
other visible indicators of social instability threaten the career prospects of officials at all levels of the 
political system (Göbel and Ong 2012). 
2.1 AUTHORITARIAN RESPONSIVENESS: WHAT WE KNOW 
Responsiveness in China is ad hoc.  The strong incentives officials face to avoid (or quickly deescalate) 
protests lead them to monitor for and react to signs of upheaval.  When faced with social unrest, 
officials typically respond with the easiest method available to contain the problem.  Often, these 
methods are repression and stonewalling, as has been seen in such high-profile cases as the 2008 
powdered milk crisis.2  But in some instances, the easiest course of action is (partially) capitulating to 
citizens’ demands.  Government officials are most likely to be responsive to citizens in situations where 
the cost of repression is high relative to the cost of minimally conceding to the demands (Cai 2010; W. 
Li, Liu, and Li 2012; Mertha 2008). 
Responsiveness is also driven by the threat of social unrest, as officials seek to preempt and 
prevent protests when possible.  An example of this can be seen in a recent field experiment by Chen, 
Pan, and Xu (2016), which found that local officials were more likely to respond to citizens’ pension 
payment requests when the requests included thinly veiled threats of collective action.  More broadly, 
there is considerable circumstantial evidence that officials sometimes seek to avoid protests by 
preemptively addressing public concerns they view as likely to foment social instability (Manion 2014; 
Truex 2016).  Indeed, China’s extensive infrastructure for monitoring public sentiment likely exists to 
identify the public concerns most prone to fuel unrest (Brady and Juntao 2009). 
Responsiveness varies by issue area.  The regime is not responsive in domains it considers to 
pose existential threats to its survival.  These sensitive domains are not precisely defined, but include 
issues such as censorship, free speech, and human rights.  Outside these sensitive areas, ad hoc 
                                                          
2 In the 2008 powdered milk crisis, melamine contamination of milk powder led to the hospitalization of tens of 
thousands of infants and multiple deaths.  The local and national government ignored the complaints filed by irate 
parents, and imprisoned the parent Guo Li, who tried to obtain compensation from a milk manufacturer. 
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responsiveness has been observed across a wide range of issue areas, includes environmental 
degradation (W. Li, Liu, and Li 2012), housing demolition (Mertha 2008), and pension payments (Cai 
2010; Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016). 
2.2 LIMITATIONS 
Without accounting for outcomes, we do not know whether and to what extent a regime’s ad hoc 
responsiveness affects the general public.  While we know that responsiveness does not exist in highly 
sensitive issue areas, extant scholarship has not established whether substantive responsiveness exists 
within any issue domain in China.   
Ignoring outcomes and feedback has also undermined quantitative analysis on this subject.  
Statically estimating responsiveness generally involves regressing indicators of government action on 
public opinion.  Indeed, positive relationships between the two have been found in China with this type 
of analysis (Tang, Chen, and Wu 2018).  While such relationships are consistent with substantive 
responsiveness, inferring causality is deeply problematic when outcomes and feedback are not 
accounted for.  If both public opinion and government action are driven by an outcome like air pollution 
severity, they will correlate even if no causal relationship exists.  As for feedback, ignoring it risks biased 




This paper’s theoretical model of responsiveness and feedback pertains to air pollution at the city level 
in China.  It consists of three variables—public concern, government action, and air pollution—and four 
causal relationships (see Figure 1).  Two of the relationships are aspects of responsiveness while the 
other two are forms of feedback.  For responsiveness: 1) public concern has a positive effect on 
government action and 2) government action has a negative effect on air pollution.  In other words, 
more (less) public concern increases (decreases) government action, and more (less) government action 
decreases (increases) air pollution.  For feedback:  3) air pollution has positive effects on both public 
concern and 4) government action.  That is, more (less) air pollution increases (decreases) public 
concern and government action.  These variables pertain to the publics, governments, and pollution 




These theoretical relationships can be formally expressed as a system of equations, where P is 
the concern of the public in city i over local air pollution at time t, G is the total action of the city 
government to mitigate local air pollution levels, A is the local air pollution level, ΔA is change in air 
pollution, and Z1, Z2, and Z3 are vectors of control variables that we discuss in appendices A, B, and C.  In 




the remainder of this section, we define each of these variables and explain the relationships we 
theorize between them. 
 
 𝑃 , = 𝑓 𝐴 , , Δ𝐴 , , 𝒁𝟏,𝒊,𝒕  ( 1 ) 
 
 𝐺 , = 𝑔 𝑃 , , 𝐴 , , Δ𝐴 , , 𝒁𝟐,𝒊,𝒕  ( 2 ) 
 
 𝐴 , = ℎ 𝐺 , , 𝒁𝟑,𝒊,𝒕   ( 3 ) 
 
3.1 PUBLIC CONCERN 
1.1.1 What Is Public Concern? 
Public concern refers to the intensity of the public’s preference for the local government to take more 
action on air pollution.  The term combines pollution’s salience with the assumption that the public 
prefers more government action to address the issue.  This concept rests on two premises: 1) citizens 
viewing air pollution as salient entails a preference for the government to do more about it, and 2) the 
salience level corresponds to the public’s prioritization of the issue.  We know empirically that the 
direction of the public’s preference does not vary meaningfully with salience in this issue area; even 
when air pollution’s salience is low, overwhelming majorities of citizens prefer more government action 
to address the problem (Lo and Leung 2000, 688).  Rather, what changes with salience is the public’s 
prioritization of the problem.  When air pollution’s salience is low, the public sees other problems as 
more pressing and worthy of government attention (Lo and Leung 2000, 687), but as salience increases 
the public sees the problem as more urgent and in need of more of the government’s attention 
(Fedorenko and Sun 2016). 
Public concern is related to public demands for government action.  Concerns are attitudes that 
citizens may choose to express or keep to themselves.  Demands are articulated.  While these concepts 
are not synonymous, they are closely associated.  As public concern increases—in terms of the number 
of concerned people and the intensity of their concerns—the number and severity of the demands they 
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articulate to government officials also increases.  Concern with air pollution has been found to 
correspond with the volume of public demands directed at both the national and local governments in 
China (Y. Dong et al. 2011; Xianbing Liu et al. 2011). 
3.1.1 Causes of Public Concern 
Public concern with air pollution is a function of the pollution’s severity, which has two aspects: the 
absolute level of air pollution, and the extent to which it is getting better or worse.  If absolute air 
pollution levels (A) are low, citizens have less reason to be concerned with air pollution relative to other 
problems, and less reason to expend time and energy pressuring local officials to take action on that 
issue.  High levels of air pollution, on the other hand, represent a serious problem that raises public 
concern and motivates citizens to intensify their demands that the local government do more to address 
it.  Extant scholarship demonstrates this relationship.  Chinese citizens submit more complaints about air 
pollution to all levels of government when concentrations are high (Y. Dong et al. 2011; Xianbing Liu et 
al. 2011). 
The change in air pollution (ΔA) reflects the extent to which the problem is getting better or 
worse.  If the problem is getting worse, the public has more reason to be concerned than when it is 
stable or improving.  While the relationship between public opinion and the change in problem intensity 
has not been well studied in China or other authoritarian systems, it has been shown to exist elsewhere.  
Scholarship comparing public opinion and economic performance in the United States, for instance, has 
found that citizens are highly sensitive to the extent to which performance has gotten better or worse 
over the previous two years (Wlezien 2015).   
How do citizens know A and ΔA?  People can directly perceive air pollution’s absolute level and 
change over time.  Studies conducted in China and elsewhere have shown that self-reported annoyance 
with pollution is highly sensitive to how much is in the air, and that the public accurately perceives how 
air pollution levels have changed over the previous three years (Amundsen, Klaeboe, and Fyhri 2008; 
Klaeboe, Amundsen, and Fyhri 2008; Lo and Leung 2000). 
3.2 GOVERNMENT ACTION 
3.2.1 What Is Government Action 
Government action refers to the aggregation of activities by local governments that mitigate air 
pollution output.  It is, in effect, a very broad conception of public policy.  We conceptualize government 
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action as having two aspects.  One is the pre-implementation stages of policymaking, which includes the 
local political leadership’s search for policy solutions, deliberation, and the formation of official policies, 
goals, and priorities (Kingdon 1995).  The other is a government’s implementation efforts.  This refers 
primarily to the activities of the leadership’s subordinates—particularly street level bureaucrats and 
other low level officials—that affect local air pollution emissions.  Recognizing these two aspects of 
government action is important because they may not always closely correspond.  Policies can be 
created by political leaders but never meaningfully carried out, and subordinates can vary the amount of 
effort they put into mitigating air pollution without directives from the leadership. 
The distinction between these two aspects of government action is especially relevant in this 
case because there is abundant evidence that the implementation of air pollution-related policy is far 
more sensitive to public concern than official policy is.  Case studies, interviews with local environmental 
protection bureau (EPB) officials, and quantitative assessments have found that citizens’ demands for 
more air pollution enforcement greatly increase the effort low level city officials put into mitigating air 
pollution (Lo and Leung 2000; Lo and Fryxell 2005; Van Rooij and Lo 2010; H. Wang 2000).  Furthermore, 
in one of the few nation-wide studies on this subject in China, Zheng and Shi (2017) find that official 
environmental policies and public complaints have independent effects on polluting firms’ decisions to 
leave a province.  This pattern of disinvestment by polluting firms suggests that both official policy and 
public pressure have sizable impacts on how effectively air pollution emissions are regulated in practice.  
It also suggests that much of the public’s effect on government implementation efforts is direct and not 
a byproduct of responsive official policy. 
3.2.2 Causes of Government Action 
Government action is a function of public concern (P).  We theorize that the main mechanisms through 
which public concern affects government action are those identified by the responsiveness literature.  
Environmental degradation is a prominent driver of social unrest in China (Göbel and Ong 2012; W. Li, 
Liu, and Li 2012), and air pollution is one of several issues on which local governments receive high 
volumes of complaints (Warwick and Ortolano 2007).  Local officials are therefore likely to use these 
complaints (and other tools at their disposal) to gauge public concern and work to mitigate air pollution 
to the degree necessary to stave off social unrest. 
We also expect that public concern affects government action through more subtle, less 
coercive, mechanisms.  Local Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) officials have said in interviews and 
surveys that public support for environmental enforcement increases the effectiveness of their efforts 
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(Lo and Fryxell 2005; Zhan, Wing-Hung Lo, and Tang 2014).  Along these lines, there is evidence that 
citizens can influence local governments’ enforcement efforts by submitting complaints that help EPB 
officials to identify illegal polluting activities (Warwick and Ortolano 2007).   
Government action is also a function of air pollution severity (A and ΔA).  Despite Chinese 
officials’ notoriously weak commitment to environmental protection (see Appendix B), we theorize that 
they respond directly to air pollution severity to some degree.  Local officials have obvious incentives to 
head off problems form the public or upper levels of government, and qualitative work has shown that 
officials are well aware that severe air pollution can attract the ire of local citizens and their superiors 
(Lo and Fryxell 2005; Lo, Fryxell, and Wong 2006; Warwick and Ortolano 2007; Zhan, Wing-Hung Lo, and 
Tang 2014).  In addition, officials and their families typically live in the cities where they work and 
breath, so they may be motivated in part by personal reasons.  It is also possible that some feel a sense 
of professional responsibility to address a problem they see in front of them. 
3.3 AIR POLLUTION 
Air pollution refers to the average concentration of air pollution at ground level within a city’s 
boundaries.  It is a function of local government action (G).  When local governments do more to 
mitigate air pollution, air pollution will be lower than it would otherwise be.  The opposite is also true.  It 
is important to note that while air pollution is a function of government action, government action is not 
the primary determinant of a city’s air pollution level—at least not in the short to medium term.  The 
main driver of local air pollution is local economic output, which we discuss along with the other 
controls in Appendix C.  Conceptually, one can think of government action as a force that pushes air 
pollution levels above or below a “natural level” that is determined by local economic output and the 
other control variables. 
By what means does government action affect air pollution emissions?  There are likely many 
mechanisms at work, as any action that reduces a city’s automobile traffic, or reliance on coal for 
electricity, heating, or cooking would reduce pollution emissions to some degree.  However, the 
mechanism over which the local governments have the most direct control is the use of various forms of 
regulatory enforcement to pressure polluting firms to relocate to other cities.  City governments use this 
mechanism extensively.  In a case study based on site visits and interviews with city EPB officials and 
senior firm managers in Shangyu, Zhu (2014) found that many local firms were relocating to other cities 
in China because of increasing environmental regulation enforcement by the local government.  Large-n 
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studies have corroborated Zhu et al.’s finding that environmental enforcement by local governments is a 
major factor causing polluting firms to relocate.  Zhou et al. (2017) and Zheng and Shi (2017) find that 
pollution intensive industries are more likely to leave cities which claim to strictly enforce air pollution 
regulations and are more likely to enter cities that do not.  Wu et al. (2017) conduct a similar study of 
water pollution regulation at the province level and reach the same conclusion.  Zhang et al. (2008) find 
that foreign direct investment for polluting industries tends to gravitate towards areas that report 





4.1 PUBLIC CONCERN 
Our measure of public concern is the Baidu index of Internet searches related to air pollution.3  The 
index represents the annual number of air pollution-related searches relative to the total search volume 
in each city going back to 2011.  It is functionally identical to Google’s search index (Vaughan and Chen 
2015).  Fundamentally, a search index reflects an issue’s salience (Mellon 2013); it does not necessarily 
indicate the public’s preferences for government action on a given issue.  However, as discussed earlier, 
air pollution’s salience corresponds with the intensity of the public’s preference for the government to 
do more to mitigate the problem (Fedorenko and Sun 2016; Lo and Leung 2000).  Indeed, Internet 
search indices have been found to be a reliable indicators of public preferences for government action 
on environmental issues cross-nationally (Oehl, Schaffer, and Bernauer 2017). 
Government censorship of the Internet is pervasive in China but unlikely to bias this measure.  
The specific topics targeted by China’s online censors are constantly shifting and notoriously difficult to 
track.  Nevertheless, we expect that most censorship related to air pollution takes the form of blocked 
websites as opposed to blocked search terms, meaning that people’s pollution-related searches should 
be reflected in the search index regardless of which websites are easily accessible.  To whatever extent 
blocked search terms do bias the measure, the likely result would be to under-represent increases in 
public concern, for censorship of a topic would presumably be most pervasive in the face of swelling 
public attention.  Thus, even if censorship biases the measure, the result would be to make the key 
statistical relationships in our analysis less significant. 
The one caveat to the search index measure is that it is not perfectly representative of the entire 
population.  China’s Internet penetration was roughly 34 percent in 2011 and 48 percent in 2015, and 
Internet users are disproportionately well educated, non-poor, and urban (China Internet Network 
Information Center 2011, 2015).  Even so, we expect that the search index is a decent indication of the 
entire public’s concern, as concern levels among societal groups in the same area are likely to move 
together in an issue area that affects the entire population.  To the extent the search index is not 
representative of the entire public, it reflects the concerns of the 34 or 48 percent of the population that 
government officials are most likely to be responsive to.  Compared to the average citizen, those who 
                                                          
3 Baidu is the dominant Internet search engine in China. 
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are educated, non-poor, and urban tend to be more concerned with air pollution (Yu 2014), more prone 
to complaining to government officials (Y. Dong et al. 2011; Xianbing Liu et al. 2011), and more willing to 
undertake collective action (J. Liu 2011). 
4.2 GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Our government action measure is derived from city governments’ work reports.  Work reports are 
published by nearly all city governments (as well as the other levels of China’s state) within the first two 
months of each year.  The first section of the reports highlights the governments’ accomplishments over 
the previous year, while all subsequent sections lay out their broad goals for the new year.4  The 
measure is the proportion of each report’s prospective section that discusses topics directly related to 
air pollution.  To calculate this proportion, we identify all paragraphs that include one or more 
keywords5 and then divide the combined length of those paragraphs by the length of the report’s entire 
prospective section.6 
The reports are a partial indicator of government action.  They are indicative of the local 
leadership’s policy priorities, which reflect one aspect of government action.  As Z. Wang (2017) finds in 
a recent qualitative study, governments put substantial effort into writing the reports and following 
through with their stated goals.  However, the reports are not a comprehensive indicator of government 
action, for they are unlikely to reflect other factors that directly influence implementation efforts.  As 
noted earlier, extant scholarship suggests that much of the public’s impact on government action is 
directly on low level officials’ implementation efforts and not through responsive official policy (Lo and 
Leung 2000; Lo and Fryxell 2005; Van Rooij and Lo 2010; Zhan, Wing-Hung Lo, and Tang 2014; Zheng and 
Shi 2017).   
                                                          
4 At the start of a new five year plan, section two focuses exclusively on five year goals while subsequent sections 
discuss goals for the year.  We exclude the section twos from our analysis in these cases. 
5 For the list of keywords, see Appendix I. 
6 We measure paragraph and section length by the number of characters because of the technical difficulty of 




4.3 AIR POLLUTION 
We measure air pollution using satellite-derived tropospheric (i.e., the air at ground level) nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) concentrations.7  NO2 is well suited for this study because it is both a dangerous air 
pollutant and an indicator of overall air pollution levels.  Exposure to NO2, which is a major component 
of smog, causes immediate physical discomfort and is associated with serious long term health 
problems, including respiratory disease and dementia (Amundsen, Klaeboe, and Fyhri 2008; H. Li and Xin 
2013).  NO2 levels are also indicative of a city’s overall air pollution level, for it is generated by the same 
economic activities as other major pollutants (Fontes et al. 2017).  Its primary emissions sources are 
combustion processes, such as those in automobile engines, coal fire power plants, and heavy industry 
(Chan and Yao 2008).  NO2 is also preferable to other common pollutants because it has a relatively 
short lifespan and is thus a more accurate indicator of local emissions (see Appendix C). 
Using satellite data allows us to avoid biased measurements from China’s ground sensors.  Local 
officials have strong incentives to manipulate pollution data and the sensors themselves, and the 
country’s pollution data show extensive evidence of tampering (Ghanem and Zhang 2014).  Any 
measurement error in the satellite data should be effectively random and not introduce bias.    
  
                                                          
7 We use the European Space Agency's DOMINO dataset (version 2), which is derived from the daily overpass 
measurements of the OMI sensor on the AURA satellite using the KNMI atmospheric model.  We discuss how we 




When air pollution is the outcome, local economic output is the most important control.  As discussed in 
Appendix C, local economic output is the main determinant of municipal air pollution because local 
economic activities are the primary emissions sources.  Our measure for each city’s economic output 
(i.e., gross regional product—GRP) is derived from the data reported in China’s official Statistical 
Yearbook.  The Yearbook values are nominal, so to account for regional purchasing power variation, we 
use the estimates of Brandt and Holz (2006) for price differences between provinces.  We then use the 
official consumer price index of each province to convert all totals into renminbi for the year 2000 to 
account for inflation.   
China’s reported economic indicators are famously suspect and there is abundant anecdotal 
evidence that official economic output measures are greatly inflated.  Even so, we are confident that 
official GRP statistics are valid measures for our purposes because this study depends on accurate 
measurement of change in GRP from one year to the next.  Satellite images of changes in China’s 
nighttime brightness, which correspond to changes in economic output (Henderson, Storeygard, and 
Weil 2012), imply that China’s reported output statistics are either not greatly inflated or (more likely) 
inflated consistently over time (Landry, Lü, and Duan 2018).  To whatever extent GRP values are not 
inflated consistently, the error terms in our models will increase, but we see no reason to think that the 
additional error would bias our results. 
We also control for pollution spillover between cities.  There is no optimal method for dealing 
with this issue, so we use four different approaches.  Each approach is imperfect, but consistency 
between them makes it unlikely that spillover is biasing our results.  The first method is to do nothing.  
Ground level NO2’s spillover tends to be low compared to other pollutants, and may be small enough 
that we can simply ignore it (see Appendix C).  The second is to use the mean NO2 level of each city’s 
eight closest neighbors as a control variable.  This approach treats pollution spillover as exogenous—it 
accounts for pollution being blown in from a city’s surroundings, but does not account for 
autocorrelation between neighboring observations in our analysis.  The third approach is to cluster the 
standard errors of our observations by province.  This approach helps account for autocorrelation 
between observations within the same provinces, but not between observations in different provinces.8 
                                                          
8 We only include the first two methods in Table D1.  For all three methods, see Table E1. 
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 The fourth method is to use a lagged spatial autoregression (SAR) model, which explicitly 
accounts for autoregression among city’s NO2 level and those of its neighbors.  This is the most 
attractive approach in principle, but it comes with two limitations.  The most serious of these is that 
incorporating an SAR into an SEM is currently impractical.  The SAR model therefore cannot account for 
the endogeneity we theorize.  The second is that we lack specific theoretical expectations for how each 
city’s neighborhood should be defined.  Monte Carlo simulations suggest that specific neighborhood 
definitions tend not to have a meaningful effect on model estimation so long as the models are correctly 
specified (Fotheringham and Oshan 2016), but this issue has been contentious among geographers 
(Gibbons and Overman 2012).  We therefore try a variety of different neighborhood definitions to 
determine that the results are consistent (see Appendix F). 
To control for top down pressure from the national government to mitigate air pollution we use 
the national government work reports.  The measure is derived with the same method used for the city 
work reports.  We also use a measure of per capita GRP to help account for miscellaneous factors that 
may influence our results, such as a city’s overall level of economic development and the financial 
resources at a government’s disposal.  The per capita GRP values of each city are taken from the 
Statistical Yearbook and adjusted for inflation and regional purchasing power variation the same way 
the absolute GRP values are. 
To help account for the unmeasured variables discussed in the appendices A, B, and C, we use 
two approaches.  The first is to include province fixed effects.  The second is to incorporate lagged 
dependent variables in our models, which control for unmeasured, city-specific factors that do not vary 
meaningfully from one year to the next.9 
  
                                                          
9 We also show that our results are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects (Appendix M) and province random 
effects (Appendix N). 
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6 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The three equations in our SEM are as follows.  The alphas are the intercepts, the betas are the 
coefficient estimates, the e’s are the error terms, and the gamma hats are the estimates for the vectors 
of control variables.  i and t represent the city and year of each observation. 
 
 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , = 𝛼 , + 𝛽 , 𝑁𝑂2 , + 𝛽 , Δ𝑁𝑂2 , + 𝛾 + 𝑒 , ,  ( 4 ) 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 , = 𝛼 , + 𝛽 , 𝑁𝑂2 , + 𝛽 , Δ𝑁𝑂2 , + 𝛽 , 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , + 𝛾 + 𝑒 , ,  ( 5 ) 
 





Figures 2 and 3 show our theoretical expectations for each relationship in the SEM and the results for 
the fully specified model, which correspond to Model 2 in Table 1.  We use this figure for the sake of 
clarity, as the SEM includes multiple relationships of interest.10 
 
 
                                                          
10 The following analysis includes all observations for which data is available (see Appendix J). 
Figure 2: Theoretical expectations.  Solid arrows indicate the theorized causal direction between variables.  
The dashed gray arrows indicate relationships for which we have no theoretical expectations but include 
for exploratory purposes.  The plus (+) and minus (—) signs indicate expected positive and negative 
relationships respectively.  The arrows originating from NO2, indicate its theorized relationship with the 
other two variables in the next time period: the search index for year t and the reports for year t + 1. 
 
 
Figure 3: Empirical results.  The values are the coefficients for Model 2 in Table 1.  †p<0.1; *p<0.05; 




The relationship most directly relevant to responsiveness is the search index’s effect on NO2, as it 
represents public concern’s effect on local air pollution.  We expect the search index to have a direct 
negative effect on NO2 in the following year.  Why do we expect a direct effect?  After all, we theorize 
that public concern affects air pollution through responsive government action.  As discussed earlier, 
however, the reports are unlikely to reflect much of the influence public concern has on implementation 
efforts, which is where existing scholarship has found public concern to have the greatest influence on 
government action (Lo and Leung 2000; Lo and Fryxell 2005; Van Rooij and Lo 2010; Zheng and Shi 
2017).  Thus, we theorize that the search index’s “direct” effect on NO2 represents the government 
action that is caused by public concern and not reflected by the reports measure. 
For the feedback between outcomes and public concern, we expect a city’s NO2 to have a 
positive effect on the search index of the same year.  Local NO2 levels should affect the search index 
almost instantly because citizens directly perceive NO2 and Internet searches are low cost and require 
no advanced planning.  We expect NO2 levels relative to the previous year (ΔNO2) to have a positive 
effect on the search index as well.  More (less) severe air pollution should cause more (less) public 
concern. 
The reports are expected to have a negative effect on NO2.  The reports reflect the government 
leadership’s priorities, so more attention to air pollution in the reports should represent an increase in 
governments’ mitigation efforts and lead to lower NO2 levels.  Because the reports are released at the 
beginning of each year and contain annual goals, they should affect NO2 over the course of that year.  
NO2’s effect on the following year’s reports represents the extent to which governments are responding 
directly to air pollution.  We expect this relationship to be positive, but relatively weak given local 
officials’ generally anemic commitment to environmental protection (Eaton and Kostka 2014). 
For the relationships between the search index and the reports, we have no specific theoretical 
expectations.  While extant scholarship leads us to believe that most of public concern’s effect on 
government action is not reflected in the reports, it is not clear whether the reports are still sensitive to 
public concern to some extent.  For the reports’ effect on public concern, we also have no expectations.  
Our theory that outcomes feed back on public concern does not preclude the possibility that 
government action feeds back as well.  
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As shown in Figure 3, each relationship corresponds with our theoretical expectations, and the 
evidence for substantive responsiveness becomes more persuasive when the results are looked at as a 
whole.  The search index’s estimated effect on pollution levels the following year is consistent with the 
substantive responsiveness we theorize.  If unobserved forms of government action are responding to 
public concern, a robust negative effect of the search index on NO2 is what we should see.  However, 
this statistical relationship is also consistent with a plausible alternative explanation: government action 
may be responsive to the air pollution problem itself, and not public concern.  In this alternative 
scenario, public concern and government action would correlate because they would be responding to 
the same signal, and—assuming the government action was effective—the search index would be 
negatively associated with NO2 the following year despite the absence of a causal link.   
The pair of relationships between the reports and NO2 help to discount this alternative 
explanation.  These relationships suggest that government action is indeed driven in part by air pollution 
severity itself; NO2 and ΔNO2 have positive estimated effects on the reports, and the reports have a 
negative estimated effect on local NO2.11  However, if government action were responding only to air 
pollution, the reports’ effect on NO2 should wipe out—or at least greatly reduce—the search index’s 
effect.12  What we actually see is that the search index remains highly significant even with the reports 
measure in NO2’s equation.  Moreover, the inclusion of reports as an explanatory variable for NO2 has 
only a negligible impact on the search index’s estimated effect.13 
It is of course impossible to definitively prove there are no other factors causing a spurious 
relationship between the search index and NO2 the following year, but the possibility is remote.  We are 
aware of no other plausible alternative explanations for this relationship.  Furthermore, our model 
explains 96 to 97 percent of NO2’s variation and 82 percent of the search index’s variation.14  Such high 
R2 values imply that there are no important missing variables that could potentially bias our results and 
cause spurious correlation.    
                                                          
11 A one standard deviation increase of the reports measure is estimated to cause a 7 μg/m3 reduction in NO2, 
which represents a decrease of a little over 1 percent for the average observation. 
12 Are the policy implementation efforts of low level functionaries responding directly to air pollution severity?  If 
there is an effect, it is very small.  Interviews and surveys of local EPB officials aimed specifically at identifying the 
factors that influence their implementation efforts have not found air pollution severity to be a significant factor, 
while they have found public concern to have a major effect (Lo and Fryxell 2005; Lo, Fryxell, and Wong 2006; 
Zhan, Wing-Hung Lo, and Tang 2014). 
13 See Appendix G for the results of models without the reports’ effect on NO2. 
14 We suspect much of the search index’s remaining unexplained variation is due to random fluctuations in the 
salience of other issues on the public's agenda (see Appendix A). 
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The results are also supportive of the feedback dynamic we theorize; NO2 and ΔNO2 have 
positive, highly significant estimated effects on the search index.  Interestingly, the feedback effect 
appears to be entirely outcomes-based.  Our findings imply that public concern is directly affected by air 
pollution severity and not at all by government action.15  This finding contradicts the policy-based 
feedback predicted by the thermostatic model.  As we discuss in the next section, we speculate that we 
find outcomes-based feedback because this study examines local-level politics, where citizens can 
directly observe the outcome. 
So far, we have only discussed the results for the fully specified SEM.  This model includes a 
spillover variable and assumes that the search index’s and NO2’s errors are correlated due to the 
ongoing feedback dynamic we theorize.  However, it is informative to compare these results with results 
for models that ignore feedback.  Unmeasured factors that affect NO2 levels and persist over time—an 
economic boom in an upwind region, for instance—will tend to push both NO2 and the search index in 
the same direction if, as we theorize, NO2 levels have a positive effect on the search index.16   The 
estimated effect of the search index on NO2 is therefore likely to be biased in the positive direction if 
feedback is present.  Because we theorize the search index has a negative effect on NO2, the bias should 
make the magnitude of the estimated effect smaller (i.e., closer to zero).   
                                                          
15 To account for the possibility that the public is responding to visible evidence of government action that is not 
reflected in the reports, we run a robustness check in Appendix H that includes a control for air pollution coverage 
in local state-controlled media, which reliably highlights evidence that the local government is effectively 
addressing the air pollution problem.  Like the reports, the media measure also does not have a significant 
negative relationship with the search index and does not meaningfully affect the other variables. 
16 Lagging the search index prevents short term disturbances to NO2 levels (such as random weather phenomena) 
from causing correlated errors, but error correlation may still occur due to unmeasured factors that persist. 
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         Table 1: SEM summary results 
 
In Table 1, we compare models that account for feedback (models 1 and 2) to models that 
disregard it (models 3 and 4).17  While models 1 and 2 assume that the search index and NO2 have 
correlated errors, models 3 and 4 assume each equation is an independent regression.  The results are 
supportive of the feedback dynamic we theorize in two key respects.  First, the search index’s estimated 
                                                          
17 For the control variable estimates, see Table D1. 
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effect on NO2 is smaller in the models that ignore feedback, which is consistent with the bias we expect 
feedback to cause.  Second, the models that assume correlated errors have better relative fit than their 
counterparts, as can be seen by their lower Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) values.18 
How substantively meaningful is this responsiveness?  Depending on how we account for 
spillover, our results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in public concern leads to a 
reduction in local NO2 by roughly 20 to 40 μg/m3 the following year, which is a 3 to 6 percent change for 
the average observation.  China’s air pollution levels are so far above what is generally considered to be 
safe that no amount of public concern is likely to bring about safe air in the near future.19  Even so, the 
effect is large enough to affect public welfare even in the short term.  A decrease of 20 to 40 μg/m3 of 
NO2 is perceptible and has been found to be sufficient to reduce people’s self-reported levels of 
discomfort (Amundsen, Klaeboe, and Fyhri 2008; Klaeboe, Amundsen, and Fyhri 2008).  The size of this 
effect also suggests near term impacts on public health.  While estimating public health impacts is 
beyond the scope of this paper, an annual decrease of 20 to 40 μg/m3 would likely lead to a small but 
significant reduction in mortality rates even within the three years of this study—and the impacts would 
be profound over time (Zanobetti and Schwartz 2009).   
  
                                                          
18 There appears not to be correlated errors between the reports and NO2, likely because the feedback dynamic 
between them is far weaker than with the search index.  Models that assume error correlation between the 
reports and NO2 have poorer fit than the models in Table 1 as measured by their AIC and BIC values. 
19 The average NO2 level for the cities in our study is 627 μg/m3.  For comparison, the American Government 




The responsiveness aspect of our model builds neatly upon our current understanding of authoritarian 
responsiveness.  Extant scholarship has found limited, ad hoc responsiveness in China, but has provided 
no clear picture on whether it is substantively meaningful for the general public.  Our findings suggest 
that these instances of responsiveness aggregate into meaningful outcomes in this issue area.  In other 
words, we find that substantive responsiveness exists in an authoritarian system.  How responsiveness 
varies across issue areas remains an open empirical question, but we speculate that substantive 
responsiveness exists in other issue domains that can be influenced by local actors and have observable 
outcomes. 
Outcomes-based feedback is perhaps our more striking finding, as it is at odds with the 
thermostatic model.  Resolving this contradiction is a task for future scholarship, but we briefly discuss 
two potential explanations here.  One possibility is that outcomes-based responsiveness is a feature of 
authoritarianism.  Perhaps China’s heavy media censorship deprives the public of credible signals 
regarding the level of government action mitigating air pollution.  It may simply not be possible for 
citizens in such a system to respond to anything other than what they can directly perceive.  However, 
we do not find this explanation very convincing in the context of local air pollution.  While China’s 
information environment is highly restricted, there are nevertheless avenues through which citizens can 
gauge the level of government action.  For example, the reports—which we find to have a significant 
effect on local air pollution—are publicly available.  More generally, many of the immediate 
consequences of increased government action, such as an exodus of polluting local employers, can be 
observed by citizens even without the aid of independent media reporting. 
The explanation we find more plausible is that outcomes-based responsiveness is a feature of 
local level politics.  Local outcomes are often observable and have clear, direct impacts on citizens’ lives.  
This is certainly true of air pollution, which citizens suffer from with every breath they take.  At the 
national level, however, outcomes tend to be more remote and harder to discern.  It may be that public 
concern responds to whatever happens to be the most accessible, seemingly reliable indicator of how 





A. PUBLIC CONCERN 
The extent to which other issues are competing for the public’s attention.  The public has limited 
attention and cannot devote equal amounts of effort to addressing all the problems it faces (McCombs 
2004).  When the public faces other pressing problems, such as rising unemployment or crime, it will 
necessarily devote less attention to air pollution, even if citizens’ beliefs that air pollution levels are too 
high does not change.   
Public concern is also a function of the public’s awareness of air pollution’s health effects.  
Breathing polluted air causes immediate physical discomfort, but the long term health risks of exposure 
are not self-evident.  As W. Li, Liu, and Li (2012) conclude based on case studies on environmental 
activism in China, the public’s perceived need for government action is driven not only by its awareness 
of environmental degradation, but also by its knowledge of the long term health risks posed by 
pollution—and its negative effect on property values.  Knowledge of pollution’s long term health 
consequences has also been identified as a key factor driving online mobilization and environmental 




B. GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Government action is driven in part by pressure on local officials from upper levels of government—
particularly the national level.  Much of this pressure is exerted through the cadre promotion system.  In 
general, the career incentives built into China’s political system lead cadres to pursue a range of 
objectives—including maximize revenue and economic development and strengthening personal 
connections with high level officials—at the expense of environmental protection (Hillman 2010; Landry 
2008).  Furthermore, municipal leaders are typically only assigned to a city for three to four years before 
being promoted or transferred, which disincentivizes them from making investments that yield long-
term environmental while imposing short-term costs (Eaton and Kostka 2014).   
The anti-environmental incentives built into China’s cadre promotion system are offset to some 
extent by national pro-environmental policies, which take the form of carrots and sticks.  An example of 
the former is the national government’s subsidies for coal plant improvements that reduce sulfur 
emissions (Xiying Liu, Lin, and Zhang 2016).  In the latter case, the national Ministry of Environmental 
Protection has periodically issued mandates intended to pressure local officials to reduce local emissions 
(Wu et al. 2017).  
Government action is also a function of the composition of the local economy, which 
determines the difficulty of reducing air pollution emissions.  The difficulties officials face are both 
technical and political.  On the technical side, cities that depend on more pollution-inelastic industries 
have a harder time reducing emissions (Kanada et al. 2013), and pollution abatement costs are generally 
lower for large scale industries and regions that depend on low grade coal for electricity (L. Dong et al. 
2015).  Politically, polluters are harder to regulate when they have more leverage over the city 
government by being a major employer, a state owned enterprise, or near bankruptcy (Lorentzen, 




C. AIR POLLUTION 
The total amount of local economic activity is the dominant factor determining a city’s air pollution level 
(Lin et al. 2014; Y. Liu et al. 2017).  Combustion processes—such as those used in automobile engines, 
electricity generation, and industry—are the primary sources of the major air pollutants in Chinese 
cities, such as NO2, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter (Chan and Yao 2008; Jiang, Lin, and Lin 2014; 
Qiu et al. 2014).   
Air pollution is also a function of the composition of the local economy.  Some industries are 
more pollution-intensive than others, and pollution intensive activities are more prevalent in some cities 
and regions (Y. Zhou, Zhu, and He 2017, 12–14).  Along with the industries themselves, the local sources 
of electricity are important determinants of air pollution.  China has made some progress in recent years 
reducing its dependence on coal, but that progress has been geographically uneven.  The types and 
grades of coal cities have easy access to also varies by province and has a substantial impact on 
emissions (Ma et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2017).  Fixed power plant characteristics, such as boiler size, affect 
their efficiency and pollution emissions as well (Xu et al. 2017).   
A third determinant of local pollution is spillover from a city’s neighbors.  The amount of 
spillover depends on the emissions output of the neighbors as well as geography and climate.  It also 
varies by pollutant.  NO2 has low spillover relative to other common air pollutants.  It typically stays in 
the troposphere for a few days or less, limiting how far it can travel (Lee et al. 2014).  The proportion of 
a city’s NO2 from spillover is likely around 10 percent (Jeong et al. 2017).  In contrast, pollutants like fine 
grain particulate mater (PM2.5) stay in the troposphere several times longer (Y. Liu et al. 2017).  Spillover 
may account for around 20 to 30 percent of city’s total PM2.5 concentration (Chan and Yao 2008; B. Zhou 
et al. 2015).   
Geography and climate are a fourth factor affecting air pollution.  The topography surrounding a 
city affects how much of the locally produced pollution accumulates before dissipating, as well as 
influencing the spillover between neighbors.  Natural barriers such as mountain ranges can concentrate 
emissions is certain areas while shielding others (Chan and Yao 2008).  Climate is also significant.  
Precipitation, temperature, and humidity all affect how long pollutants remain in the troposphere, 
which in turn affects how much pollution accumulates in a city before dispersing and how far the wind 
can carry it (Jeong et al. 2017; B. Zhou et al. 2015).  Wind direction, strength, and consistency over the 
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course of a year also affect the distribution of emissions after they have been produced (Y. Liu et al. 




D.  SEM RESULTS WITH CONTROLS 
 
Table D1 SEM results with Controls 
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E. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR SPILLOVER 




F. SAR MODELS 
The SAR model is expressed as follows, where ρW(NO2) represents the effect of pollution spillover on 
the dependent variable.  W is the spatial weights matrix representing city i’s neighbors and ρ is its 
coefficient estimate for the effect of pollution spillover on the dependent variable.  t represents the year 
and 𝛾 is a vector of control variable estimates. 
 
 NO2 , = α , + ρW NO2 , + β , Reports , + β , Search. Index , + γ + e , ,  ( F1 ) 
 
Table F1 shows the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the above equation with four different 
neighborhood definitions.  The definitions include all observations that are within the radius, as 
measured from a city’s center point to the center point of other cities.  These coefficient estimates do 
not reflect the spatial weights and are not directly interpretable.  Note that the ρ is around 0.1 in all four 
models, which is consistent with our expectation that roughly 10 percent of a city’s NO2 is attributable 
to spillover. 
Table F2 shows the total impacts of each variable on NO2 along with the significance levels from 

















Table F2: SAR model impacts 
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G. RESULTS WITHOUT REPORTS’ EFFECT ON NO2 










H. CONTROLLING FOR STATE MEDIA COVERAGE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 
The models in Table H1 include a state media variable in the search index equation and are otherwise 
identical to those in Table 1.  We use this variable to check whether public concern really is responding 
directly to government action (as the thermostatic model predicts), but is not responding to the 
particular aspect of government action represented by the government reports.  Local state media is 
propaganda---its coverage of air pollution typically portrays the issue as one that the local government is 
effectively addressing.  If public concern is responding to government action by way of what citizens see 
in state media, state media should have a significant negative relationship with public concern.20 
As Table H1 shows, state media coverage of air pollution does not have a negative relationship with 
the search index while the reports' effect on the search index remains insignificant.  In fact, the state 
media's estimated effect is positive and highly significant.  We speculate that this is because state media 
is responding to public concern.  That is, when the public becomes more worried about air pollution, 
state media devotes more time to portraying the local government as having the problem under 
control.21  That state media lacks a negative relationship with the search index is further evidence that 
the public concern is not directly responding to government action. 
  
                                                          
20 The state media measure is the total number of articles in each city's daily party newspaper which contains at 
least one keyword related to air pollution over the course of a year.  The key words are Air Quality (空气质量), Air 
Pollution (空气污染), Air Pollution (大气污染), PM2.5, PM10, and NO2.  This list of keywords is shorter than the list 
for government work reports because these searches had to be performed through a library database.  The terms 
not related specifically to air pollution—clean energy, environmental pollution, environmental protection, green 
economy, and new energy—produced too many matches for the database to report.  Three others—atmospheric 
protection, emissions, and emissions reduction—produced too many matches and tended to refer to carbon 
dioxide emissions as opposed to local air pollution.  Several other terms are highly technical and produced 
negligible numbers of matches—nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and NOx. 
21 It is extremely unlikely that the media coverage itself is causing public concern to increase in this case; the 
coverage is intended to reduce public concern without raising awareness. Upon reading a random selection of 300 
of the 12,107 newspaper articles in our sample that include one or more of the search terms, we found none that 
discussed air pollution increases over time, the health dangers posed by long-term exposure, which firms were 
guilty of flouting environmental rules or were especially egregious polluters, or which government officials were 
most responsible for addressing pollution problems. Instead, the articles consistently suggested that air pollution 
was not a serious problem and—to the extent it was a problem—was already being effectively addressed by the 
government. Many of the articles claimed that air pollution had decreased year on year, or that the city in which 
the newspaper was based had the cleanest air in its province or region. Many others highlighted efforts by city 




Table H1: Summary results including control for local state media coverage 
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I. GOVERNMENT WORK REPORT KEY WORDS 
These are the keywords used to identify air pollution-related paragraphs in the government work 
reports with English translations.  Each term is equally weighted in our measurement. 
 
Air Pollution (空气污染), Air Pollution (大气污染), Air Quality (空气质量), Atmospheric Protection (大气
保护), Emissions (排放), Emissions Reduction (减排), Clean Energy (清洁能源), Environmental Pollution 
(环境污染), Environmental Protection (环境保护), Green Economy (绿色经济), New Energy (新能源), 




J. CASE SELECTION 
Our analysis uses all observations for which data are available.  Notably, our analysis excludes the 
province-level municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) due to the unavailability of 
comparable search index data for those cities.22  The following series of figures shows the location of all 
cities in our sample (Figure J1), and the locations of the cities for each year of our data (Figures J2 – J4).   
As can be seen in these figures, the number of cities in our sample increases each year.  This 
pattern is driven almost entirely by the availability of the government work reports for each city.23  We 
address the possibility that the availability of the reports could be causing some sort of bias in Appendix 
K.  It is possible, for instance, that cities only begin releasing reports when they feel the need to be 
responsive to the public. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Because of their special administrative status, Baidu's search index considers them to be provinces. 





Figure J1: All cities in sample.  The shaded areas represent the 273 cities that are in our sample for at least one year. 
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Figure J2: Cities in sample for 2013.  The shaded areas represent the 2012 cities that are in our sample for 2013. 
 
 










K. SEM’S EXCLUDING THE REPORTS MEASURE 
Table K1 shows the summarized results for the models in Table 1 without any reports measures.24  
Excluding the reports allows us to increase the sample size to 817 observations (of the 819 possible for 
the 273 cities in our analysis.).  If the increasing availability of the reports over time were biasing the 
results in some way, then these estimates should be noticeably different from their counterparts in 
Table 1.  What we see, however, is that the relationship between the search index and NO2 remains 
virtually unchanged by the increased sample size. 
 
Table K1: Results summary excluding the reports variable 
 
 
                                                          
24 The national level reports control is still a control variable for the NO2 equation. 
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L. NO2 SATELLITE DATA 
Our NO2 data are from the European Space Agency’s DOMINO dataset (version 2), which is derived from 
the daily overpass measurements of the OMI sensor on the AURA satellite using the KNMI atmospheric 
model.  The grid’s resolution is 0.125 by 0.125 degrees (around 12.5 by 12.5 km at the equator) and 
extends from 2005 past 2015.  Most cities straddle multiple grid spaces, so we calculate municipal NO2 
concentrations as the weighted means of the grid spaces each city occupies.  To calculate the weighted 
means, we up-sample the monthly grids to 0.0125 by 0.0125 degrees using bilinear interpolation25 and 
take the mean of all grid squares that are partially or entirely within each city’s administrative 
boundary.26  We then annualize the monthly means and remove any observation that is missing one or 
more months.27     
The OMI-derived NO2 grid has imperfect spatial coverage, and its gaps are not consistent from year 
to year, particularly after 2007 when OMI suffered a partial malfunction (Schneider 2015).  Missing OMI 
data would reduce our sample size by around 100 observations and create a significant number of holes 
in our dataset.  We therefore substitute the missing NO2 values with rescaled values from the European 
Space Agency’s METOP-A and METOP-B satellite-derived datasets (version 2.3), which are lower 
resolution but have near total spatial coverage of China.   
  
                                                          
25 Bilinear interpolation treats the values associated with the original 0.125 by 0.125 degree (roughly 12.5 by 
12.5km) grid spaces as points at the exact center of each grid square and then calculates the values for the smaller 
0.0125  by 0.0125 degree (roughly 1.25 by 1.25km) squares as averages of the four closest points weighted by 
inverse distance.  We use this interpolation method because it is conservative; it does not introduce values outside 
the range of the original data and makes no assumptions about the presence of geographic boundaries (such as 
mountain ranges) or prevailing winds. 
26 The boundaries are defined by the second administrative level boundary map from the GADM database of 
Global Administrative Areas (version 2.8), which correspond to China's prefecture and prefecture-equivalent 
boundaries in 2015. 
27 Air pollution varies substantially by season, but its time series within season is stationary (X. K. Wang and Lu 
2006).  A missing month of measurements therefore risks biasing an observation. 
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M. YEAR FIXED EFFECTS 
Table M1 shows the SEM results with year fixed effects included in all three equations and the national 
reports controls removed.28  Broadly speaking, these results are consistent with our results in Table 1.  
However, the key variables in the search index and NO2 models all have smaller coefficients (though 
similar standard errors) than in the main results.  In several cases, the smaller coefficients push the 
estimates’ significance levels below conventional significance thresholds.  These smaller coefficients 
suggest that temporal variation is an important component of our main results.  While it is not possible 
to perform deep time series analysis with only three time periods, we strongly suspect that public 
awareness across cities tends to move together over time.   
                                                          








N. PROVINCE RANDOM EFFECTS 
Table N1 uses random province effects instead of fixed effects.  The control variable estimates are 
displayed.  With one minor exception, all variables of interest remain significant with estimates 
comparable to our primary results in Table 1.  The exception is ΔNO2 in Model 2.  Substantively, this 
result is not much different than our primary results with fixed effects.  The estimates for Model 2 in this 
table imply that the reports are responsive to absolute NO2 levels but not year on year change in NO2.  
Model 2’s fixed effect counterpart suggests that the reports are responsive to both NO2 and ΔNO2. 
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